AI与劳动政策时间线

追踪全球各国政府和机构如何应对AI对就业的影响。

2025年1月起的数据

国家:
类型:

2026年6月

🌍企业2026年6月26日

Anthropic Economic Index report: Cadences

Anthropic

Anthropic Economic Index June 2026 report "Cadences" analyzing how AI usage mirrors human rhythms — workweeks, daily schedules, key dates. Based on privacy-preserving telemetry (Apr 10–Jun 10, 2026) plus a linked survey of ~9,700 respondents. Key findings: personal use rises from ~35% weekday to ~50% weekend; tax queries spiked 8x on April 14; 93% of conversations produce artifacts; higher-wage occupations (marketing managers, programmers) use 2.5x more tokens and 1.34x output per turn; over 35% expect AI to handle most tasks within 12 months yet workers delegating most are the most optimistic (86% productivity gains, only 10% fear job loss); early-career workers carry the most concern (1/3 see junior job-loss probability >60%); computer/math roles 30% of respondents vs 4% of US employment; physical occupations underrepresented. Underlying data: BLS OEWS (May 2025), World Bank WDI, UN WPP.

🇪🇺国际组织2026年6月24日

What separates firms that use AI intensively from firms that don't?

European Central Bank

ECB SAFE survey round 37 (Oct-Dec 2025, 5,000+ euro area firms): 70%+ of firms use AI but only 7% intensively. Intensive users are smaller, younger, ICT/professional-services firms driven by growth not cost-cutting; 84% have completed AI investments and allocate ~20% of total investment to AI. Top barriers: skills shortage (40%) and finance.

🌍学术2026年6月19日

Human Capital, AI, and Labor Commoditization

arXiv

Study of 49,610 Upwork workers and 2.26M contracts (2021Q1-2026Q1) finds generative AI reduced the importance of human capital signals (credentials, experience, reputation) by 7.8% in AI-exposed categories. Contract volume fell ~7%, demand shifted to lower-cost workers (3.2%->7.9% share), price weight rose (1.1%->1.8%), and the high vs low human-capital demand gap narrowed (10.3%->6.2%). Average AI exposure across 102 subcategories was 0.252; highest Legal Translation (0.80), lowest Photography (0.02).

🇨🇦政府2026年6月17日

Workplace artificial intelligence use: A profile of sociodemographic and job characteristics

Statistics Canada

StatCan survey: generative AI use among Canadian workers nearly doubled from 17% to 30% in under a year (Sep 2024–Jul 2025), concentrated in degree-holding analytical and knowledge-sector roles.

🌍企业2026年6月16日

PwC 2026 Global AI Jobs Barometer: Two futures for jobs in an AI era

PwC

PwC analyzed 1B+ job ads across 27 countries. AI-exposed firms grew headcount 52% vs 36% and wages 24% vs 17% since 2018. AI skills wage premium hit 62% (up from 57%). Two-track market: professionalised jobs grow 2x faster with 42% faster wage growth than democratised jobs. AI-exposed entry-level roles up 35% since 2019 while others fell 10% ("seniorization"); junior AI roles 7x more likely to require senior skills. AI-skill jobs grow 8x faster (69% vs 9%). Tech/media/telecom led at 11%.

🇬🇧政府2026年6月6日

Entry-level jobs support: AI bootcamps and tech training as government supports young people into the jobs of the future

UK Government (DSIT & DWP)

The UK launched a £20m Early Careers Jobs Alliance (co-chaired by the Prospect union, with partners including Microsoft, Accenture, BAE Systems and JD Sports) alongside the TechFirst programme reaching 400,000 students, an £820m Youth Guarantee supporting almost 1 million young people via 350,000 placements and 360+ youth hubs, and a phased AI bootcamps rollout (North West summer 2026, nationwide 2027-2028). National target: 10 million UK workers AI-upskilled by 2030 (1.7m courses completed).

2026年5月

🇺🇸政府2026年5月26日

Climbing the employment ladder tough when bottom rung is broken

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Dallas Fed economists find youth (under-25) employment in highly AI-exposed occupations fell ~13% since 2022. The decline comes not from layoffs but from a falling job-finding rate — young workers cannot get hired in the first place. Firms pull back on entry-level recruitment while competing aggressively for proven, experienced talent, because AI now handles much codified (textbook) knowledge while tacit (experience-based) knowledge stays scarce. Computer systems design wages rose 16.7% since fall 2022 vs 7.5% nationally, evidence of a widening experience premium.

🇺🇸学术2026年5月22日

Generative AI and the Reorganization of Labor Demand

arXiv

Wang, Wei & Wang (2026) measure AI exposure dynamically at the job-posting level across the U.S. economy using a two-stage LLM pipeline. Decomposing the decline in AI exposure: 52% comes from hiring reallocation, 39.5% from within-job task redesign; observable job characteristics explain ~90% of exposure changes (Oaxaca-Blinder). Senior roles adjust earlier via reallocation; junior roles via a broader mix of reallocation, redesign, and their interaction.

🇺🇸智库2026年5月21日

The adoption of AI by industrial sectors

PIIE

PIIE analysis by Hufbauer & Zhang finds AI adoption is skill-biased: high-wage service sectors (information, finance, professional services) lead with 30%+ firm adoption while retail/hospitality/food services lag. Large firms (250+) tripled adoption from ~4% to ~12% (2023-2025); large-firm employment share rose 37.6% (2000) to 42.3% (2025). Modest positive correlation between compensation and AI adoption. Labor displacement effects deemed premature/inconclusive.

🌍企业2026年5月11日

How ChatGPT adoption broadened in early 2026

OpenAI Signals Research

OpenAI Signals Q1 2026 update documents ChatGPT consumer adoption broadening across age (35+ gaining share), gender (feminine-name users now majority), and geography (Dominican Republic +9, Haiti +9, Japan +8, Mexico +6, Tanzania +6, Brazil/Costa Rica/Myanmar/Papua New Guinea +5 in per-capita messaging rank between Q4 2025 and Q1 2026).

🇺🇸企业2026年5月7日

April 2026 Job Cuts Report: Cuts Rise 38% From March, YTD Cuts Down 50%

Challenger, Gray & Christmas

April 2026: 83,387 US job cuts (+38% MoM, -21% YoY). AI #1 reason at 21,490 cuts (26%), second straight month. YTD AI cuts 49,135 (16% of all 2026 cuts, up from 13%). YTD total 300,749 (-50% YoY). Technology led industries with 33,361 cuts in April (85,411 YTD, +33%). Hiring announcements down 69% MoM to 10,049.

🇺🇸智库2026年5月5日

AI growth acceleration versus distributional fairness

Brookings Institution

Brookings synthesis arguing AI-driven growth acceleration is plausible but not guaranteed. Diffusion is highly uneven across sectors, firms, countries, demographic groups. Relative employment declines for early-career workers in AI-exposed occupations identified using high-frequency payroll data. Five-pillar policy recommendation including complementary capabilities investment, strategic procurement, transition tools, measurement standards, broad-based asset ownership.

🇩🇪政府2026年5月5日

Artificial Intelligence in German establishments: One in four has adopted generative AI (IAB-Kurzbericht 08/2026)

IAB (Institute for Employment Research)

IAB-Kurzbericht 08/2026 (Friedrich & Kagerl) reports that generative AI adoption among German establishments rose nearly fivefold from 5% (2023) to 24% (2025), based on the ~15,000-establishment IAB-Betriebspanel. Adoption is 48% at firms with 200+ employees vs 21% at firms under 10; leading sectors are information & communication (59%) and finance & insurance (50%), while construction, hospitality, transport and raw materials stay below 15%. 90% of adopters use off-the-shelf tools; only 16% train purchased models and 6% build their own. About half invested financially, 25%+ offer AI training, and 20% have workplace AI rules.

2026年4月

🇺🇸学术2026年4月30日

Evaluating the Impact of AI on the Labor Market: March 2026 CPS Update

Yale Budget Lab

March 2026 CPS update finds no meaningful shift from December across most categories. Occupational dissimilarity, industry dissimilarity, and exposure/usage metrics all remain flat or continue along existing trends. Notable uptick in occupational mix dissimilarity between older and younger college graduates (high end of historical range). Anthropic February 2026 usage data shows observed usage more associated with automation than augmentation, consistent with prior November 2025 release. Conclusion: anxiety widespread but data suggests AI labor market impact remains largely speculative — picture reflects stability, not major disruption at economy-wide level.

🇺🇸企业2026年4月23日

Today at Work 2026, Issue 1: AI Powers Into the Workplace

ADP Research

ADP 2025 Global Workforce Survey (payroll data for 25M+ US workers + 600,000+ workers across 34 countries) finds 50% of workers use AI at least a few times weekly and 20% almost daily. Daily AI users report higher full engagement (30% vs 14% non-users; 19% baseline) and lower overload (11% vs 23%), yet are 4x more likely to feel less productive than capable — a productivity paradox the authors attribute to workers perceiving they personally did less. Young workers and men lead adoption; early-career workers aged 22-25 in AI-exposed fields (software development, customer support) face employment-growth concerns and are less optimistic about job security.

🌍学术2026年4月21日

From Clerks to Agentic AI: How Will Technology Transform the Labor Market in Finance?

arXiv

Yu & Li (April 2026) track 40 years of financial labor productivity across three regimes: computerization (1.36 AUM/employee coefficient), indexing (2.42), and agentic AI era (3.39 — 149%% higher than baseline). AI exposure correlates +0.5843 with AUM/employee but -0.0535 with revenue/employee, indicating volume-over-yield strategy. Mid-layer coordination roles face greatest pressure.

🇺🇸企业2026年4月21日

The Rise – and Rise – of Knowledge Work

ADP Research

ADP Research analysis (Nela Richardson and Tim Decker, 2026-04-21) of 25-year US employment composition trends. Professional services share grew from 14.9% (Jan 2000) to peak 17.6% (Jan 2022), declining to 16.8% (Jan 2025). Administrative/support roles fell from 47.5% (Jan 2020) to 39.5% (Jan 2025). Management/scientific consulting expanded from 10.1% (Jan 2020) to 17.3% (Jan 2025). Computer programming roles showed strongest 25-year growth. Data: BLS QCEW + ADP employment data + UMich consumer sentiment + Census retail sales + DOL unemployment claims. Affected occupations: legal services, accounting, architecture, engineering, design, advertising, computer programming, scientific research, management consulting, technical services.

🌍国际组织2026年4月17日

Workers exposure to AI: What indicators tell us and what they don't

ILO

ILO Research Brief warning that AI exposure indicators (3.3% global highest exposure, 34% HIC vs 11% LIC, female 4.7% vs male 2.4%) measure technical task overlap with current AI capabilities — not predictions of job displacement.

🇺🇸企业2026年4月15日

The AI Jobs Transition Framework: Mapping AI's Near-Term Impact on Jobs

OpenAI

OpenAI economist Alex Martin Richmond maps 921 US occupations covering 99.7% of US employment using a 4-dimension framework: technical capability, human necessity (regulatory/relational/physical), demand elasticity, and ChatGPT consumer usage data (H2 2025). Findings: 18% face higher short-term automation risk (legal, education, office/administrative); 46% likely see less change; 24% may see employment decline as task composition shifts; 12% could grow because of AI. Insulated roles include teachers, nurses, lawyers due to regulatory, relational and physical necessity. ChatGPT usage 3x higher in high-risk jobs.

🇺🇸企业2026年4月15日

ChatGPT Usage and Adoption Patterns at Work

OpenAI

OpenAI April 2026 workplace report: 28% of US workers use ChatGPT (up from 8% in 2024), Fortune 500 adoption 93%, 7M+ Enterprise/Team seats. Four core tasks: writing, research, programming, analysis. Adoption split sharply between IT/finance (deep) and healthcare/construction/transportation (lagging).

🌍学术2026年4月15日

WorkRB: A Community-Driven Evaluation Framework for AI in the Work Domain

arXiv

Evaluation framework for AI work-domain capabilities. Low blog value (framework paper, not labor market impact evidence).

🇺🇸🇦学术2026年4月15日

AI Is Probably Not (Yet) the Reason for Labor Market Weakening

The Budget Lab at Yale

Yale Budget Lab March 2026 CPS analysis: US unemployment rose to 4.3% but AI exposure/automation/augmentation metrics show no relationship to employment changes. Immigration slowdown, not AI, is the primary driver of labor market weakening. Dissimilarity index flat since ChatGPT 2022; recent graduates (20-24) show no growing divergence from older workers (25-34).

🇺🇸学术2026年4月13日

Inside the AI Index: 12 Takeaways from the 2026 Report

Stanford HAI

Annual AI Index 2026 report highlights: software developer employment (22-25) down ~20% since 2024, 14-26% productivity gains in customer support/SW dev, 73% expert vs 23% public optimism gap, US ranks 24th in AI adoption (28.3%), AI researcher US inflow down 89% since 2017, GenAI consumer surplus $172B, 53% global usage, physician note-writing time reduced 83%.

🇺🇸企业2026年4月7日

AI Impact on Labor: Double-Edged Sword

Morgan Stanley

Morgan Stanley analysis: AI added at most 0.1 percentage point to overall US unemployment rate. Gen AI impact is double-edged — same technology that automates tasks also augments labor and raises productivity.

🇺🇸企业2026年4月7日

Is your job safe?

ADP Research

ADP Research Global Workforce Survey of 39,000+ workers found only 25% globally and 28% in the U.S. feel their jobs are safe. Age breakdown: 18-26: 26%, 27-39 & 40-54: 30%, 55-64: 23%. Three contributing factors: geopolitical concerns, AI impact, ongoing inflation. Workers feeling secure are 6× more likely to be fully engaged and 3.3× more likely to report high productivity. Authored by Nela Richardson Ph.D. April 7 2026.

🇺🇸企业2026年4月6日

AI Eliminating 16,000 U.S. Jobs Per Month

Goldman Sachs

Goldman Sachs economist Elsie Peng finds AI substituting 25K jobs/month while augmenting 9K, net loss 16K. Gen Z hardest hit with 3.3pp wage gap widening. Insurance clerks, bill collectors at highest substitution risk.

🇺🇸企业2026年4月2日

Challenger Report: March Cuts Rise 25% From February, AI Leads Reasons

Challenger, Gray & Christmas

March 2026: 60,620 total job cuts, AI led all reasons with 15,341 cuts (25%). Q1 YTD: 217,362 total, 27,645 AI (13%). Cumulative AI cuts since 2023: 107,094. Tech sector Q1 up 40%, Healthcare record Q1 high.

🇺🇸智库2026年4月2日

How AI may reshape career pathways to better jobs

Brookings Institution

Analysis of 70M STARs (non-degree workers): 15.6M in high AI-exposed roles, 3.5M at dual risk (high exposure + low adaptive capacity). Nearly half of career advancement pathways from Gateway to Destination occupations are highly AI-exposed. Florida metros most affected. Uses Anthropic observed exposure measure.

🇺🇸学术2026年4月1日

The 2026 AI Index Report

Stanford HAI

Stanford HAI's 2026 AI Index documents accelerating AI capability, investment and adoption, and highlights early labor-market signals including employment declines among younger workers in AI-exposed entry-level occupations.

🇺🇸学术2026年4月1日

Crashing Waves vs. Rising Tides: Preliminary Findings on AI Automation from Thousands of Worker Evaluations of Labor Market Tasks

MIT / arXiv

MIT researchers evaluated 3,000+ text-based O*NET tasks through 17,000+ worker assessments. Found "rising tides" pattern: AI task success climbing from ~50% (2024-Q2) to ~65% (2025-Q3), projected 80-95% by 2029. Little evidence of sudden "crashing waves" displacement. Adoption timelines expected to substantially lag capability gains.

🇪🇺国际组织2026年4月1日

AI and the US Labour Market: Effects on Employment Growth

European Central Bank

ECB Economic Bulletin (Issue 4/2026) finds US occupations at high AI-substitution risk declined more than 4% from 2019-2025 while low-risk occupations grew 13%, a ~15pp employment wedge that widened fastest after ChatGPT's late-2022 launch. Low-risk share rose 23%->25% of employment, high-risk fell 35%->33%. No significant wage-growth effect detected. Difference-in-differences with sector fixed effects.

🇺🇸学术2026年4月1日

2026 AI Index Report: Economy Chapter

Stanford HAI

Economy chapter of 2026 AI Index. Key findings: software developers aged 22-25 employment fell nearly 20% from 2024; ~1/3 of surveyed organizations anticipate workforce reductions over coming year; expected decreases concentrated in service operations, supply chain, and software engineering; productivity gains measured at 14-15% (customer support) and 26% (software development). AI labor effects concentrated in hiring pipelines and youngest workers in exposed occupations.

🇺🇸学术2026年4月1日

Forecasting the Economic Effects of AI

National Bureau of Economic Research

Karger, Kuusela, Tetlock et al. (15 co-authors) ran a structured forecasting exercise across 5 groups (academic economists, AI company employees, policy researchers, superforecasters, general public). Median GDP growth forecast through 2050: 2.5% (vs CBO baseline 2.0%/1.7%). Under rapid AI scenario: GDP ~4%/year, labor force participation drops 62.7% to 55%, ~10M jobs displaced by AI specifically. Main driver of disagreement: not AI capability timelines, but what high-capability AI does to the economy. Policy preferences: experts favor targeted retraining + portable benefits; general public prefers UBI + federal job guarantees.

2026年3月

🌍学术2026年3月31日

Economics of Human and AI Collaboration: When is Partial Automation More Attractive Than Full Automation?

arXiv

MIT/IBM working paper develops a unified framework for optimal task automation. Convex AI accuracy cost curve makes partial automation the cost-minimizing equilibrium. 11% of computer-vision-exposed labor compensation captured at firm level; share rises sharply under economy-wide deployment. Calibrated with O*NET task data, 3,778 domain expert surveys, GPT-4o decompositions.

🌍学术2026年3月31日

Agentic AI and Occupational Displacement: A Multi-Regional Task Exposure Analysis of Emerging Labor Market Disruption

arXiv

Introduces Agentic Task Exposure (ATE) score framework. Analyzes 236 info-intensive occupations across 5 US tech hubs. 93.2% cross moderate-risk threshold by 2030 in Tier 1 regions. High-risk: credit analysts, judges, sustainability specialists (ATE 0.43-0.47). 17 emerging occupational categories in AI governance. Authors: Gupta & Kumar.

🌍国际组织2026年3月27日

New ILO-World Bank paper highlights uneven global impact of generative AI on jobs

ILO / World Bank

Joint ILO-World Bank background study for WDR 2026 analyzing GenAI labor market exposure across 135 countries. Finds uneven impact: advanced economies face higher exposure in clerical/professional roles; developing economies risk faster disruption than productivity gains due to digital gaps. Women and youth disproportionately vulnerable.

🇺🇸智库2026年3月25日

A people-first vision for the future of work in the age of AI

Brookings Institution

Policy vision by Friedler, Booth, Schrank, Helper proposing worker-centered AI policies: minimum staffing laws in care sectors, tripartite institutions, participatory AI design. Cites 50%+ Americans fear AI displacement (Reuters/Ipsos). Occupations mentioned: teachers, nurses, social workers, software engineers, manufacturing, utility, guest room attendants.

🇺🇸学术2026年3月25日

The AI Layoff Trap: Automation Arms Race

arXiv (Wharton)

沃顿arXiv论文:AI裁员陷阱——争相自动化的企业正在制造集体行动困境,可能适得其反。

🇺🇸企业2026年3月24日

Economic Index March 2026: Learning Curves

Anthropic

Anthropic经济指数2026年3月:49%的工作已在25%以上的任务中使用AI。学习曲线显示早期采用者正在拉开差距。

🇺🇸企业2026年3月22日

How AI Is Transforming Work at Anthropic (Internal Data)

Anthropic

Anthropic内部数据:工程师59%的工作使用AI。揭示了实际使用模式与外部估计之间的差距。

🇺🇸智库2026年3月20日

Building Pro-Worker AI

Brookings (Acemoglu, Autor, Johnson)

Acemoglu、Autor、Johnson(布鲁金斯):三位顶尖经济学家认为当前AI发展路径正在伤害工人。

🇺🇸学术2026年3月20日

AI Hiring Is Booming While Everything Else Stalls

Stanford HAI + Indeed

斯坦福HAI与Indeed数据:AI招聘激增而非AI招聘停滞,形成双轨劳动力市场。

🇺🇸媒体2026年3月18日

How AI Is Changing the Labor Market

Dallas Federal Reserve + HBR

HBR与达拉斯联储综合分析:AI通过不同渠道同时帮助和伤害工人——生产力提升与岗位替代并存。

🇺🇸媒体2026年3月18日

AI and the Entry-Level Job

Harvard Business Review + IBM

IBM将初级岗位招聘增加两倍,而竞争对手在裁员。HBR案例研究:AI时代的逆势人才战略。

🇺🇸学术2026年3月18日

Gen AI Wont Make Your Employees Experts

Stanford + Harvard

斯坦福-哈佛研究:AI无法弥合经验差距。8个月实地研究显示,AI反而放大了现有的技能差异。

🇺🇸政府2026年3月17日

AI and Young Workers: Employment Effects

Dallas Federal Reserve

达拉斯联储数据显示,科技行业青年就业自2022年初开始下降,比ChatGPT发布早了数月。

🇨🇭国际组织2026年3月17日

Disruption without dividend? How the digital divide and task differences split GenAI's global impact

International Labour Organization

ILO Working Paper 166 examines generative AI's uneven labor-market effects across 135 countries. Advanced economies face higher automation exposure (30-32% of employment), but developing nations face a paradox: workers vulnerable to displacement already have internet connectivity, while those positioned to gain from AI-driven productivity often lack reliable digital infrastructure. The paper warns that "disruptive effects may materialize before benefits" in some developing economies, underscoring gaps between AI's technological potential and actual implementation capacity.

🇺🇸企业2026年3月17日

Equipping workers with insights about compensation

OpenAI + University of Michigan

ChatGPT wage usage study: In Jan-Feb 2026, US consumer ChatGPT users sent ~3M messages/day about wages, compensation, or earnings. Workers use ChatGPT to navigate wage info gaps, especially in labor markets with high uncertainty. Joint study with University of Michigan on how Americans engage with AI for wage information. Released 2026-03-17.

🇺🇸智库2026年3月16日

New Data Show No AI Jobs Apocalypse — For Now

Brookings Institution

布鲁金斯学会33个月分析显示:AI尚未导致大规模失业,但特定行业已出现预警信号。

🇺🇸智库2026年3月15日

AI Labor Displacement and the Limits of Worker Retraining

Brookings Institution

布鲁金斯学会考察了历史上的再培训项目,发现对被替代工人的成功率有限。

🇺🇸智库2026年3月15日

Evaluating the Impact of AI on the Labor Market: January/February CPS Update

Yale Budget Lab

33 months after ChatGPT release, AI exposure metrics, occupational dissimilarity, and industry dissimilarity all flat or within historical ranges. Recent vs older college graduate dissimilarity in 30-33% band since Jan 2021. Anthropic Feb 2026 usage data tilts toward automation rather than augmentation. Direct quote: exposure/automation/augmentation measures show no sign of being related to changes in employment or unemployment.

🌍国际组织2026年3月15日

Generative AI and Jobs: Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure

ILO

ILO跨138个国家的改进指数:由于职业隔离模式,女性面临的自动化风险是男性的两倍。

🇺🇸智库2026年3月15日

Research on AI and the Labor Market Is Still in the First Inning

Brookings Institution

布鲁金斯学会荟萃分析指出,AI对劳动力市场的研究仍处于最早期阶段——大多数论断超前于现有证据。

🇺🇸媒体2026年3月15日

Karpathy AI Job Exposure Score for Every US Job

Andrej Karpathy / Fortune

Karpathy(前OpenAI)为每个美国职业评估AI暴露度。白领专业人士显示出最高脆弱性。

🌍国际组织2026年3月15日

World Employment and Social Outlook: Trends 2026

ILO

国际劳工组织旗舰报告:全球失业人数达1.86亿,AI悖论——生产力提升却未带来就业复苏。4.08亿人缺乏体面工作。

🇺🇸智库2026年3月10日

Measuring US Workers Capacity to Adapt to AI-Driven Job Displacement

Brookings Institution

布鲁金斯学会发现610万美国工人AI暴露度高但适应能力低——结构性脆弱性地图。

🇺🇸智库2026年3月5日

AI and Young-Adult Jobs: The Real Mystery

Economic Innovation Group

EIG研究质疑AI影响青年就业的叙事:就业下降存在非AI原因,包括疫情后的市场调整。

🌍企业2026年3月5日

Labor market impacts of AI: A new measure and early evidence

Anthropic Economic Research

Anthropic introduces "observed exposure" — a new metric measuring AI's actual deployment in real workflows. Computer Programmers top at 75% observed exposure; full Computer & Math category sits at 33% (vs 90% theoretical). 30% of workers have zero observed exposure. New hires aged 22-25 in high-exposure fields drop ~0.5pp.

🇪🇺国际组织2026年3月4日

Reverse gear: how AI is bringing vocational occupations back

Cedefop

Cedefop analysis of EU online job advertisements shows VET (vocational education and training) occupations' share fell from 36% (2019-mid 2022) to 33% (mid 2022 trough), then recovered above 36% by early 2025 — coinciding with the emergence of generative AI in late 2022. Declining categories: software developers, sales & marketing, customer info workers, database specialists. Growing categories: engineering technicians, machinery mechanics, construction trades, transport workers.

🇺🇸学术2026年3月1日

Still Waters, Rapid Currents: Early Labor Market Transformation under Generative AI

NBER

Danish admin data + adoption surveys show rapid AI chatbot adoption and reported productivity gains, but precise null effects on earnings and recorded hours at worker/workplace level (within 2%) two years after ChatGPT launch. Employers reorganized tasks rather than reducing workforce.

🌍国际组织2026年3月1日

Generative AI, Occupational Segregation and Gender Equality in the World of Work

ILO

This ILO study examines how generative AI intersects with occupational gender segregation, concluding that women are roughly twice as likely as men to be in highly exposed clerical roles, which could widen labor-market inequalities without targeted policy.

🌍国际组织2026年3月1日

Generative AI and Jobs: A Refined Global Index of Occupational Exposure (Research Brief)

ILO

This ILO research brief presents a refined global index of occupational exposure to generative AI, finding that clerical and administrative jobs are most exposed and that women face higher exposure than men because of their concentration in such roles.

🇮🇳企业2026年3月1日

India Brief: Economic Index

Anthropic

Anthropic印度简报:全球第二大AI用户群体,但人均采用率排第101位——规模与深度的鸿沟。

🇺🇸学术2026年3月1日

Tracking the Impact of AI on the Labor Market

Yale Budget Lab

The Yale Budget Lab tracks AI's labor-market impact using current population data and finds that occupational exposure has stayed broadly stable since the launch of ChatGPT, with no clear sign of large aggregate disruption to employment yet.

🇺🇸学术2026年3月1日

AI, Productivity, and the Workforce: Evidence from Corporate Executives

NBER

Survey of 750 corporate executives. Over half invested in AI. Little evidence of near-term aggregate employment declines. Larger companies anticipate reductions, smaller firms expect gains. Productivity paradox: executives perceive larger gains than data shows.

2026年2月

🇺🇸企业2026年2月28日

February 2026 Job Cuts Report

Challenger, Gray & Christmas

Challenger报告:2026年1-2月有12,304个岗位因AI被裁撤,同时招聘计划同比下降56%。

🌍国际组织2026年2月25日

Fed's Barr Names 3 AI Scenarios — Including 'Essentially Unemployable'

Bank for International Settlements (BIS Review)

🇺🇸媒体2026年2月20日

AI Doesnt Reduce Work — It Intensifies It

Harvard Business Review

HBR的8个月实地研究发现,AI增加了工作强度而非减轻负担——生产力悖论。

🇺🇸学术2026年2月19日

An AI Productivity Boom? Don't Count Your (Productivity Data) Chickens

Yale Budget Lab

Skeptical analysis of AI productivity boom claims. Productivity data is too noisy and lagged to confirm GenAI productivity gains.

🇺🇸企业2026年2月17日

Pay trends to watch in 2026

ADP Research

ADP Research January 2026 payroll panel: job-changers 6.4% YoY wage growth vs job-stayers 4.5% (1.9pp premium, smallest since 2020). New-hire median base pay jumped from $18 to $19/hour after 18-month plateau, driven by construction and financial services. Average weekly hours 1 hour below pre-pandemic, near 7-year low. ~45% of workers now part-time (<35 hrs/wk), +6pp vs 2019. Sector switcher premium: construction +6.6pp, mining +5.6pp, leisure/hospitality negative. Authored by Nela Richardson Ph.D. and Liv Wang Feb 17 2026.

🇺🇸学术2026年2月15日

Yale Budget Lab: AI Exposure Hasn't Moved Workforce Distribution Since ChatGPT

The Budget Lab at Yale

🇺🇸智库2026年2月15日

Is Generative AI a Job Killer? Evidence From the Freelance Market

Brookings Institution

布鲁金斯自由职业市场研究:高技能自由职业者受AI冲击最大,颠覆了低技能优先被替代的叙事。

🇺🇸智库2026年2月1日

Building Pro-Worker AI

The Hamilton Project (Brookings)

Acemoglu, Autor and Johnson argue that AI should be steered toward complementing workers rather than replacing them, identifying barriers such as misaligned incentives and a pro-automation bias, and proposing nine policy measures to make AI more pro-worker.

🇺🇸学术2026年2月1日

Firm Data on AI

NBER

Survey of 6,000 executives across US/UK/Germany/Australia finds 69% use AI but 90% report zero employment/productivity impact. Executives predict -0.7% employment next 3 years; employees expect +0.5% growth.

🇺🇸学术2026年2月1日

Payrolls to Prompts: Firms Replacing Labor With AI

arXiv (Payrolls to Prompts)

arXiv研究:企业每削减1美元自由职业预算,仅花3美分在AI上——替代是不完整的。

2026年1月

🌍学术2026年1月28日

Graph-Based Analysis of AI-Driven Labor Market Transitions

arXiv

Analyzes 9,978 Egyptian job postings using knowledge graphs. Finds 20.9% of jobs face high automation risk, but only 24.4% of at-risk workers have viable transition pathways. 75.6% face structural barriers requiring comprehensive reskilling, not incremental upskilling. Process-oriented skills appear in 15.6% of feasible transitions.

🇰🇷政府2026年1月20日

Characteristics and Assessment of Resting Youth

Bank of Korea

Analysis of Korean youth in "resting" status: 6.3%p higher probability for non-college youth, reservation wage 31M KRW (not high), AI cited as labor market deterioration factor, debunks "high standards" narrative

🌍企业2026年1月20日

How AI is changing early careers: A view from entry-level workers

PwC + World Economic Forum

PwC+WEF joint survey of 9,394 entry-level workers across 48 economies. 47% curious about AI, 38% excited, 29% worried. 76% say job security is most important factor, but only 53% feel confident. Presented at Davos 2026.

🇺🇸媒体2026年1月20日

Companies Are Laying Off Workers Because of AIs Potential, Not Performance

Harvard Business Review

HBR分析:CEO们基于AI潜力而非实际表现裁员。每50项AI投资中仅1项具有变革性。

🇺🇸企业2026年1月15日

Anthropic Economic Index: January 2026

Anthropic

Anthropic经济指数:AI的实际生产力提升为1.0%而非报道的1.8%——大部分使用是增强而非自动化。

🇺🇸智库2026年1月15日

Looking for the Ladder: Is AI Impacting Entry-Level Jobs?

Economic Innovation Group

In this EIG working paper, Zanna Iscenko and Fabien Curto Millet (Google economics team) analyze whether AI is eroding entry-level employment. They find job postings declined more in AI-exposed occupations, but the inflection point began in 2022, months before ChatGPT's public release. The timing aligns better with the macroeconomic shift of rising interest rates than with the launch of large language models, challenging the dominant narrative that AI is the primary driver of weakening entry-level hiring.

🌍学术2026年1月15日

Payrolls to Prompts: Firm-Level Evidence on the Substitution of Labor for AI

arXiv

Ryan Stevens (Ramp applied science) analyzes firm-level spending on Ramp expense management platform (2021 Q3 - 2025 Q3). Top-exposed firms substitute $1 in labor for only $0.03 in AI spend (33x cost savings); mid-exposed firms at $0.30. Online labor market spending fell from 0.66% (2021 Q4) to 0.14% (2025 Q3); AI spending rose from 0% to 2.85% over same period. 50%+ of firms reduced online labor spending to 0%. Limitation: covers online freelance markets only, no occupation-level decomposition.

🇺🇸学术2026年1月10日

AI-Exposed Jobs Deteriorated Before ChatGPT

University of Pittsburgh + RAND

匹兹堡/RAND对1050万LinkedIn档案的研究:AI暴露岗位在ChatGPT发布前8-10个月就已开始恶化。

🌍国际组织2026年1月7日

The Future of Jobs Report 2026

World Economic Forum

The WEF Future of Jobs Report 2026 surveys employers worldwide on how AI and automation will reshape roles by 2030, projecting large-scale displacement alongside even larger job creation and a major shift in required skills.

🇺🇸政府2026年1月6日

AI is reshaping entry-level hiring while lifting pay for experienced workers

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

Dallas Fed economists examine employment and wage trends across more than 200 occupations since ChatGPT's late-2022 release. They find AI is simultaneously reducing employment in the most exposed industries (computer systems design down roughly 5%) while pushing wages higher for experienced workers in those same fields. Entry-level workers face the steepest challenge because AI can replicate codified textbook knowledge but not the tacit knowledge built through years of experience, so the labor-market impact hinges on whether AI automates or augments tasks.

🇪🇺国际组织2026年1月1日

State of play of convergence 2026 — Job quality in the EU

Eurofound

This Eurofound policy brief assesses whether job quality across EU Member States is improving and whether workplace standards are converging or diverging. It analyzes key indicators on fairness, health and safety, work-life balance, skills for the digital transition, and the role of social dialogue and collective bargaining, alongside disparities in social-protection access and persistent gender gaps. The comparative cross-country evidence is intended to inform current policy debates, including development of the EU Quality Jobs Act.

🇺🇸学术2026年1月1日

Enhancing Worker Productivity Without Automating Tasks: A Different Approach to AI and the Task-Based Model

NBER

Agrawal/McHale/Oettl: AI as productivity tool vs task replacer, wage inequality depends on skill distribution

2025年12月

🇰🇷政府2025年12月24日

AI 인재 5.7만 명 시대, 왜 기업은 사람이 없다고 할까?

한국은행

Korea has 57K AI specialists but 6% wage premium (vs US 25%), 16% brain drain, 30% firms lack AI job definitions.

🇺🇸学术2025年12月15日

Stanford AI Experts Predict What Will Happen in 2026

Stanford HAI

2026 predictions: emergence of high-frequency AI economic dashboards tracking task/occupation-level productivity, displacement, new roles. Shift from speculation to careful measurement. Round-up prediction article, not primary research.

🌍企业2025年12月15日

AI Jobs Barometer 2025

PwC

PwC调查发现,AI暴露岗位的生产力提升4倍,薪资溢价达56%,远超非暴露岗位。

🇬🇧学术2025年12月5日

Beyond Automation: Redesigning Jobs with LLMs to Enhance Productivity

arXiv

UK Civil Service study analyzing 193,497 job vacancies and 1,542,411 tasks for AI exposure. Finds productivity gains, not just displacement. Authors propose redesign framework: automate, optimize, reallocate.

🇰🇷政府2025年12月5日

AI 전문인력 현황과 수급 불균형: 규모, 임금, 이동성 분석

한국은행

BOK Issue Note 2025-36: 57K AI workforce with 58% holding graduate degrees, 69% large firms plan to expand AI hiring.

🇺🇸政府2025年12月1日

Incorporating AI Impacts in BLS Employment Projections 2024-34

Bureau of Labor Statistics

美国劳工统计局首次将AI影响纳入2024-2034官方就业预测——方法论转变。

2025年11月

🌍企业2025年11月25日

Agents, Robots, and Us: Skill Partnerships in the Age of AI

McKinsey Global Institute

MGI report: $2.9T US value by 2030, 57% work hours automatable, 40% jobs highly automatable, 70%+ skills transferable

🇰🇷政府2025年11月6日

AI 확산 초기, 청년고용은 왜 감소하는가?

한국은행

Youth employment declined 2.11M over 3 years with 98.6% in AI-exposed sectors. Junior workers with codified knowledge most vulnerable.

🇺🇸企业2025年11月1日

The State of AI: Global Survey 2025

McKinsey & Company (QuantumBlack)

McKinsey's QuantumBlack surveyed 1,993 participants across 105 nations (June-July 2025) on enterprise AI adoption. Some 88% of respondents report regular AI use in at least one business function, up from 78% a year earlier, though most enterprises remain in experimenting or piloting stages and only about a third have begun scaling. Sixty-two percent are at least experimenting with AI agents and 23% are scaling agentic systems, yet just 39% report enterprise-level EBIT impact. The highest-value performers redesign workflows and pursue growth and innovation, not efficiency alone.

2025年10月

🇰🇷政府2025年10月30日

AI 확산과 청년고용 위축: 연공편향(seniority-biased) 기술변화를 중심으로 [BOK 이슈노트 제2025-30호]

한국은행 (Bank of Korea)

BOK Issue Note No. 2025-30. In Korea over the past 3 years, youth (ages 15-29) employment in high-AI-exposure sectors fell by 211,000 jobs, of which 208,000 (98.6%) occurred specifically in AI-high-exposure sectors. Senior (50+) employment grew by 209,000 in same period, with 146,000 in AI-exposed sectors. AI diffusion exhibits 'seniority-biased technological change' — entry-level (codifiable, routinized) jobs replaced by AI, while jobs requiring tacit knowledge and social skills show complementarity. Korea GenAI adoption rate 63.5% (work-use 51.8%) — roughly 2x US, 8x faster diffusion than internet adoption.

🇺🇸学术2025年10月15日

AI and Demographic Changes

Yale Budget Lab

Martha Gimbel analysis: AI exposure intersects with workforce aging and immigration. Some aging-heavy occupations (legal secretaries, admin assistants) show higher AI exposure; passenger attendants show minimal applicability. AI exposure concentrates in occupations with lower shares of foreign-born workers. Commentary piece, no numerical breakdowns in article body.

🇺🇸企业2025年10月3日

GDPval: Evaluating AI Model Performance on Real-World Economically Valuable Tasks

OpenAI

GDPval benchmark: 1,320 tasks across 44 knowledge-work occupations in 9 top-GDP sectors (Real estate, Government, Manufacturing, Professional services, Health care, Finance, Retail, Wholesale, Information). Top models (GPT-5, Claude Opus 4.1) rated as good as or better than humans in ~50% of tasks. 100x faster and cheaper than experts. Occupations include: software developers, lawyers, registered nurses, mechanical engineers, accountants, financial analysts, customer service reps, pharmacists, project management specialists, police supervisors, producers/directors, and others. Based on O*NET + BLS May 2024 wage data.

🌍学术2025年10月1日

Remote Labor Index: Measuring AI Automation of Remote Work

arXiv

Introduces a Remote Labor Index to measure AI automation capability across remote-work tasks. Key finding: AI capabilities on remote-work benchmarks are rising rapidly but remain below human baseline for complex multi-step tasks. Relevant for occupations dominated by remote knowledge work.

🇺🇸学术2025年10月1日

Evaluating the Impact of AI on the Labor Market: Current State of Affairs

The Budget Lab at Yale

This Budget Lab at Yale analysis evaluates whether AI is measurably reshaping the US labor market, using occupational and industry dissimilarity metrics alongside AI-exposure measures. The data show no substantial acceleration in the rate of change in labor-market composition since ChatGPT's introduction; dissimilarity and exposure metrics remain flat or follow prior trends. The authors conclude the picture reflects stability rather than major economy-wide disruption, while cautioning that better data is needed and committing to regular updates of the analysis.

2025年9月

🌍学术2025年9月18日

AI and jobs: A review of theory, estimates, and evidence

arXiv

Meta-review of AI exposure and employment literature. Synthesizes theoretical frameworks, empirical estimates, and emerging evidence across 2023-2025. Tests consistency of exposure scores (Felten, Webb, Pizzinelli) with observed hiring patterns.

🇺🇸企业2025年9月15日

How People Use ChatGPT (NBER Working Paper 34255)

OpenAI / NBER

Aaron Chatterji, Thomas Cunningham, David J. Deming, Zoe Hitzig, Christopher Ong, Carl Yan Shan, Kevin Wadman. NBER WP 34255 (Sep 2025). ChatGPT adopted by ~10% of world adult population by Jul 2025; gender gap narrowing; higher growth in lower-income countries. Non-work messages grew 53% -> 70%+. 75% of conversations focus on practical guidance, information seeking, and writing. 49% of messages are Asking mode (advisor) showing decision-support value especially in knowledge-intensive jobs. Privacy-preserving automated classifier on de-identified messages. Companion to OpenAI compensation paper (#64) and GDPval (#65).

2025年8月

🇺🇸企业2025年8月26日

Yes, AI is affecting employment. Here's the data.

ADP Research

ADP Research examines how generative AI is reshaping employment across worker age groups, drawing on Stanford Digital Economy Lab findings. Employment for workers aged 22-25 fell about 6% between late 2022 and July 2025 in AI-exposed fields like software development and customer support, while older workers in the same roles saw employment gains of 6-13%. The analysis distinguishes AI tools that automate tasks from those that augment human work, concluding that early-career professionals in easily automatable roles face the greatest vulnerability.

🇰🇷政府2025年8月18日

Rapid Spread of AI and Productivity Effects: Based on Household Survey

Bank of Korea

63.5%% of Korean workers use GenAI (51.8%% for work), 3.8%% work time reduction, 1.0%% productivity gain, autonomous robot collaboration 11%%->27%%, equalizing effect for junior workers

🇦🇺🇸政府2025年8月14日

Our Gen AI Transition: Implications for Work and Skills

Jobs and Skills Australia

JSA Gen AI Capacity Study Overarching Report. First national whole-of-labour-market study by Australian government. 358 occupations analyzed using ANZSCO + two-axis (augmentability + automatability) framework. Key findings: 79% low risk, 21% meaningful exposure (routine clerical concentrated).

🇦🇺政府2025年8月14日

Our Gen AI Transition: Industry Exposures & Adoption (Industry Data)

Jobs and Skills Australia

A companion dataset to Jobs and Skills Australia's Generative AI Capacity Study (14 August 2025), this analysis presents AI exposure and adoption patterns at the industry level across the Australian economy. It complements the occupation-level data by showing which sectors face the greatest AI exposure and where adoption is concentrated, supporting a whole-of-labour-market view of generative AI's potential, its impact to date, and what is needed to support Australia's digital and AI transition.

🇦🇺政府2025年8月14日

Our Gen AI Transition: Exposures, Adaptation, Dynamism (Occupation Data)

Jobs and Skills Australia

Part of Jobs and Skills Australia's Generative AI Capacity Study (released 14 August 2025), this dataset maps AI exposure by occupation using ANZSCO v1.3 unit-level classifications. It measures how jobs are changing in response to AI, including the extent of task adaptation, worker mobility between roles, and overall occupational dynamism. The findings show augmentation generally outweighs automation, with higher automation potential concentrated in routine roles and women-dominated occupations, while entry-level positions show no evidence of widespread displacement in Australia yet.

🇺🇸智库2025年8月10日

AI and Jobs: The Final Word (Until the Next One)

Economic Innovation Group

EIG researchers Sarah Eckhardt and Nathan Goldschlag examine whether AI is currently driving meaningful job losses across the US labor market, testing five different AI-exposure measures against unemployment, labor-force participation, occupational switching, and industry employment. They find no substantial employment losses among AI-exposed workers; highly exposed workers actually show lower unemployment than less-exposed peers. The authors conclude AI adoption is accelerating (~9% of businesses) but real economic diffusion remains modest, with most firms reporting neutral or positive employment effects.

2025年7月

🌍学术2025年7月10日

Advancing AI Capabilities and Evolving Labor Outcomes

arXiv

Empirical analysis linking AI capability advancement to labor market outcomes. Higher AI exposure associated with reduced employment, higher unemployment rates, and shorter work hours. Evidence consistent with 2025 AI-related hiring slowdowns and layoffs.

🌍国际组织2025年7月1日

OECD Employment Outlook 2025

OECD

The OECD Employment Outlook 2025 reviews labor-market conditions across member countries and examines how AI adoption is affecting jobs, wages and skill demand, finding uneven exposure across occupations and limited net employment effects so far.

2025年6月

🇺🇸学术2025年6月1日

AI Index Report 2025

Stanford HAI

斯坦福HAI AI指数2025:跨国综合分析AI采用率与失业趋势的关系。

2025年3月

🇺🇸学术2025年3月24日

Augmenting or Automating Labor? The Dual Impact of AI on Jobs and Wages

arXiv

Studies 2015-2022 US data using instrumental variables. Finds automation AI negatively impacts new work, employment, and wages in low-skilled occupations, while augmentation AI fosters new work and raises wages for high-skilled occupations. Concludes AI may accelerate existing wage inequality.

2025年1月

🇺🇸学术2025年1月1日

Technological Disruption in the Labor Market

NBER

Deming/Ong/Summers: Historical labor disruption analysis, STEM jobs 50%+ surge since 2010, AI as potential GPT

监测来源

我们持续监测的AI与劳动力市场研究机构和组织。目前追踪49个活跃来源。

S

S级

(5)
  • bis.org每月
  • ilo.org每年
  • imf.org每月
  • unctad.org每年
  • worldbank.org每月
A

A级

(30)
  • adpresearch.com每月
  • ai-watch.ec.europa.eu每月
  • aiindex.stanford.edu每年
  • anthropic.com每周
  • arxiv.org每日
  • bls.gov每月
  • bls.gov每月
  • bok.or.kr每月
  • brookings.edu每周
  • budgetlab.yale.edu每月
  • cedefop.europa.eu每月
  • challengergray.com每月
  • dallasfed.org每月
  • ecb.europa.eu每月
  • eib.org每季度
  • eurofound.europa.eu每月
  • gov.uk每月
  • hai.stanford.edu每月
  • hdr.undp.org每年
  • iab.de每月
  • ilo.org每月
  • jil.go.jp每月
  • jobsandskills.gov.au每月
  • mods.go.kr每月
  • nber.org每月
  • oecd.org每年
  • onetonline.org参考
  • ons.gov.uk每月
  • openai.com每月
  • statcan.gc.ca每月
B

B级

(9)
  • adb.org每季度
  • eig.org每月
  • hamiltonproject.org每月
  • iadb.org每季度
  • keis.or.kr每季度
  • kli.re.kr每季度
  • oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk每年
  • piie.com每月
  • unesco.org每年
C

C级

(5)
  • bls.gov每年
  • hbr.org每周
  • mckinsey.com每月
  • pwc.com每月
  • weforum.org每年

来源按可靠性等级分类(S最高),纳入前经过许可证和可信度审核。